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Prenatal screening tests can identify genetic disorders in a fetus, but their take-up remains low in several 
countries. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design, we test the causal effects of a policy that eliminated co-
payments for noninvasive prenatal screening tests in Italy. We find that the policy increases the probability of 
pregnant women’s undergoing prenatal tests by 7 to 10 percentage points, and the effect varies by 
socioeconomic status. We do not find evidence of substitution effects with invasive tests or that the tests affect 
the termination of a pregnancy and newborn health. We do find evidence of positive effects on mothers’ health 
behaviors during pregnancy.  
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Medical literature has long recognized that appropriate prenatal care, such as recommended doctor 
visits and tests in the first stage of pregnancy, can decrease the likelihood of adverse outcomes for 
both the mother and the child (e.g., Almond and Currie 2011). Prenatal tests are offered in the first 
trimester of pregnancy in many high-income countries to identify possible genetic disorders, for 
example, Down syndrome and Edwards’ syndrome, in the fetus (Boyd et al. 2008; Palomaki et al. 
2006; Grimes and Schulz 2002). Two different types of test are typically available. Noninvasive 
screening tests, such as combined or integrated prenatal screening tests, are generally inexpensive 
and allow doctors to estimate the risk of genetic disorders.1 More invasive diagnostic tests are costly 
but permit doctors to diagnose the presence of chromosomal anomalies with greater accuracy through 
a genetic map of the fetus. 
Combined, these tests can detect congenital anomalies that affect around 0.3 to 0.5 percent of 
newborns. Congenital anomalies are leading cause of infant mortality, morbidity, and long-term 
disability (EUROCAT 2010). Accuracy, safety, and the mother’s peace of mind are often cited as the 
benefits of the prenatal tests (e.g., Dormandy et al. 2005). Types of genetic screening programs as 
well as medical recommendations and guidelines are heterogeneous across countries. At the 
beginning of the 2000s, many countries implemented new rules to harmonize policies at the national 
and international levels, but the process is ongoing (World Health Organization 2016). 
The literature (e.g., Crombag et al. 2014) and international health organizations (EUROCAT 2010) 
highlight the variability in take-up rates for prenatal tests across and within countries as a critical 
issue. Such variability may be explained by many factors, including differences in service delivery 
and the health system, socioeconomic traits and cultural components of the population, and market 
failures (e.g., underestimation of benefits and positive externalities associated with the use of prenatal 
care). Policymakers justify the introduction of free screening programs to the underserved by pointing 
to the perceived suboptimal take-up of screening tests within some institutional settings (Currie 2006; 
Shurtz et al. 2016). 
In this study, we apply quasi-experimental methods to investigate whether eliminating co-payments 
for screening tests is an effective policy to increase the take-up of screening and to improve health 
outcomes for pregnant women and children. We use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to 
                                                          
1
 Our study does not include the last generation of noninvasive prenatal tests (NIPT), which are based on an analysis of 
small fragments of DNA of the fetus circulating in the mother’s blood. These tests have been offered only in the last five 
years and exclusively in private facilities. 
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quantify the effect of a government policy in a large region in Italy that eliminated co-payments for 
noninvasive prenatal screening tests.  
This paper addresses three research questions. First, we test the extent to which eliminating co-
payments for noninvasive tests increases their utilization and whether in turn this reduces the 
utilization of the costlier and riskier invasive tests (a substitution effect). Second, we investigate 
heterogeneity in the effect across different groups, in particular, women with low socioeconomic 
status. Although some noninvasive prenatal screening tests are inexpensive, even a relatively small 
co-payment can be a barrier and discourage women from disadvantaged groups from undergoing the 
tests. We therefore investigate whether the elimination of the co-payment not only increases 
utilization but also whether it reduces inequalities in access to prenatal care. Third, the lack of prenatal 
care is associated with poor birth outcomes, such as low birth weight, preterm birth, and infant 
mortality (Woodhouse et al. 2014; Currie and Rossin-Slater 2015; Corman et al. 2018), as well as an 
impaired health status of mothers (Conway and Kutinova, 2006). Thus, we investigate whether an 
increase in prenatal tests affect newborns’ health status and mothers’ health behaviors. 
We provide evidence on these questions by considering the interesting case of Italy. Regions in Italy 
have a high degree of autonomy in legislating healthcare policies, including prenatal and maternal 
care. Prenatal tests for the diagnosis of Down syndrome and other chromosomal disorders have been 
available since 2001 for all Italian women, including those covered by the Regional Health Service 
of the Piedmont Region.2 The regional co-payment scheme required women to contribute to the cost 
of these tests. The co-payment for noninvasive screening tests was in the range of €27–54, depending 
on the specific test provided (the combined test, the triple test, or the integrated test). For invasive 
diagnostic tests, the co-payment was in the €160–200 range, depending on the specific test provided 
(chorionic villus sampling or amniocentesis) and a number of maternal characteristics.3  
In 2009, the regional government of Piedmont eliminated the co-payment for noninvasive screening 
tests, making the noninvasive tests available to all women free of charge. No change occurred to the 
co-payment for invasive diagnostic prenatal tests. The aim of the policy was twofold. First, public 
authorities wanted to improve efficiency by increasing the take-up of noninvasive screening tests. 
These tests are less costly and less risky than the more-invasive diagnostic tests. Moreover, recent 
                                                          
2 Piedmont is a large region located in the northwest of Italy. In 2010, it had around 4.5 million inhabitants, and the 
number of annual births was 35,000. The Piedmont annual GDP per capita is about €30,000, in purchasing power 
standards, in 2016 (Eurostat). Piedmont has roughly the same population as Ireland, or a medium-sized US state, such as 
Kentucky or Louisiana. The crude birth rate (number of live births per 1,000 inhabitants) is around 8, which is slightly 
lower than the Italian average birth rate (8.5), and much lower than the EU (10), and the US birth rates (12.5). 
3 The Regional Health Service reimbursed hospitals €98 for a noninvasive screening test (e.g., the integrated test) and 
€592 for an invasive diagnostic test (e.g., amniocentesis). 
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developments make them almost as reliable as the invasive tests.4 Screening tests facilitate the 
identification of women with a high risk of delivering an infant with congenital anomalies. Once 
identified and informed, these women can obtain the invasive (and costlier for the public purse) 
diagnostic tests for free. Second, given the observed low take-up rates, mostly among certain more-
deprived socioeconomic groups, the policy aimed to improve equity by mitigating these disparities in 
access to prenatal tests. 
Our RDD approach to identifying the impact of the co-payment reform is justified by the eligibility 
rules. First, after the policy became effective, all pregnant women were automatically eligible5. 
Second, the initial general policy was announced in May 2008, but the detailed rules about the policy 
was made public only in August 2009, which almost coincides with the start of the policy on October 
1, 2009. Third, we can reasonably rule out any manipulation of the pregnancy decision as a strategic 
reaction to the elimination of the co-payment. The decision to have a child is a momentous one, which 
involves careful consideration of many factors. The price of prenatal tests represents a negligible 
portion of the cost of raising a child, and the elimination of the co-payment should not have any effect 
on the number of women becoming pregnant after the policy implementation. This generates a 
discontinuity in the treatment assignment between women becoming pregnant before and after the 
policy cutoff date. We therefore use time as our running variable, an approach which is similar to Ito 
(2015) and Halla et al. (2016). 
Our key results are as follows. First, we find that the elimination of the co-payment increases the 
probability that a woman undergoes any prenatal tests by 7 to 10 percentage points, depending on the 
functional specification considered. Women’s increased use in the screening test, by 7 to 9 percentage 
points, mostly drives the results. The average pre-policy rate of noninvasive screening prenatal tests 
was 62 percent; the policy increased the take-up rate for screening tests by 11 to 15 percent. However, 
we do not observe any substitution effects because the elimination of the co-payment did not reduce 
the take-up rate of the costlier invasive diagnostic tests. This result is mainly driven by the behavior 
of women who are older than 35 years at conception. Prior to the elimination of the co-payment, these 
women could already access free diagnostic tests based on a legislative provision that considered 
these women to be at high risk of congenital disorders. After the co-payments were eliminated for all 
women, the over-35 women could also obtain costless screening tests. However, these women have 
not changed their behavior after the policy change; they are still likely to by-pass the screening tests 
and undergo the invasive diagnostic tests. Hence, the reduction in the proportion of women who do 
                                                          
4 Boyd et al. (2008) and Palomaki et al. (2013), for instance, point out that many improvements in prenatal screening 
methods are responsible for the increase in detection rates of birth defects. 
5
 Notice that this makes inappropriate the use of a Difference-in-Differences model: as the policy affects all women, we 
lack a clear control group. 
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not undergo any test is due entirely to the increase in the proportion of women who undergo 
noninvasive screening tests.  
Second, we find heterogeneity in the impact of the reform across women with different 
socioeconomic statuses. The elimination of the co-payment increased the take-up rate, especially for 
women 25–34 years old, those born abroad, those who reside in metropolitan areas, and those with 
an intermediate education.  
Third, accounting for self-selection in prenatal care, we assess whether screening tests affect the 
health outcomes of mothers and newborns. After ruling out any increase in the number of pregnancy 
terminations following the policy, we use the discontinuity in eligibility for free prenatal screening 
tests triggered by the policy as an instrumental variable for utilization and find that prenatal tests have 
a positive effect on health behaviors during pregnancy. In particular, screening tests reduce the 
mother’s weight gain, alcohol consumption, and hospital admissions during pregnancy. This is 
consistent with the view that greater access to prenatal tests may have downstream effects on the use 
of other prenatal services and on the health outcomes of pregnant women (Metcalfe et al. 2013). In 
contrast, we do not find any effects of prenatal screening tests on the health status of newborns at 
delivery. 
Prenatal tests have been the focus of economic studies. Fajnzylber et al. (2010) develop and calibrate 
a model of amniocentesis choice and find that the amniocentesis take-up rate should decrease (instead 
of increase) with age, once all the risk factors are considered (e.g. the risk of an affected child, the 
risk of miscarriage associated to amniocentesis, as well as the risk of a decline in fertility with age). 
Seror (2008) uses an interview-based survey to assess different models of amniocentesis choice. 
Gajdos et al. (2016) exploit French amniocentesis regulations to offer a measure of the disutility 
associated with a child with Down syndrome.  
The studies by Garrouste et al. (2011) and Shurtz et al. (2016) are the closest to our work. They 
investigate the effect of public policies aimed at subsidizing diagnostic prenatal tests (amniocentesis) 
in France and in Israel, respectively. Both studies find that utilization rates rise sharply when women 
are eligible for full reimbursements.  
Our contribution differs from previous studies in three important dimensions. First, our main focus is 
on noninvasive prenatal screening tests. To our knowledge, no other economics paper has studied this 
type of prenatal test. Screening tests are not conclusive, but they are less expensive and widely used 
across different medical specialties (e.g. cholesterol measurement tests, Pap tests, fecal occult blood 
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tests, mammography) to identify subpopulations that may require additional care.6 Our study 
contributes to identifying the effects of the subsidization of prenatal screening tests on take-up rates 
and, in turn, on mother and newborn health. Second, we test for substitution effects between screening 
and diagnostic tests, which none of the preceding papers has done. Third, the institutional setting is 
different, which allows to us to compare findings across health systems.  
We also contribute to the literature on prenatal care and its short-run effects on the health of mothers 
and children. Most of the existing literature on prenatal care focuses on children’s health (see Corman 
et al. 2018 for a recent survey). Only few papers explore, within a causal setting, the beneficial effects 
of prenatal care on health during pregnancy (e.g. Conway and Kutinova 2006; Yan 2017). Our 
contribution closes this gap in the existing literature by estimating causal effects of prenatal screening 
tests on the health of both children and mothers. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the institutional background. A 
conceptual framework to inform the empirical analysis is provided in Section 3. Section 4 describes 
the data, and Section 5 describes the empirical strategy. In Section 6 we present the results, and 
Section 7 draws policy implications and conclusions. 
2 The Reform of the Co-Payment Scheme for Prenatal Tests  
2.1 Institutional setting 
The Italian National Health Service (NHS) is a tax-funded system providing universal coverage to all 
citizens. While funding of the NHS and framework legislation are provided by the central 
government, the management and provision of day-to-day health services is performed on the 
regional level (Turati 2013). Within the limits set by national legislation, the twenty regional 
governments organize their hospital network, staff the public hospitals, and set the Diagnosis Related 
Group (DRG) rates and the co-payment rules for resident citizens. 
In 2000, the Ministry of Health introduced a framework for improving maternal and child health 
(Ministerial Decree April 24, 2000, Progetto Obiettivo Materno Infantile – Project for the Promotion 
of Maternal, Infant, and Child Health). The plan contained guidelines to define a safe birth plan for 
mothers and newborns. Recommendations for regional governments included counseling services, 
                                                          
6 Within the literature on screening programs, Bitler and Carpenter (2016, 2017) find that more-generous insurance 
coverage induces a large and significant increase in the utilization rates of breast cancer and cervical cancer screening 
programs (mammography and Pap test, respectively) in the US. Cohen et al. (2015) find that subsidizing a rapid diagnostic 
malaria test doubled the test take-up rate in Kenya. 
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prenatal diagnostic care, the de-medicalization of childbirth, active postnatal care, and support for 
breastfeeding. 
One of the recommendations at the national level was to improve the take-up of prenatal genetic 
testing. Prenatal tests for Down syndrome (trisomy 21) and other genetic diseases (trisomy 18 or 
Edwards syndrome, and spina bifida) can be grouped into two broad classes: diagnostic and screening 
tests. Diagnostic tests are more invasive and mainly consist of removing a sample of fluid from the 
amniotic sac. Given their invasive nature, there is a risk of miscarriage (around one percent). The two 
most common diagnostic tests are amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling (CVS), which were 
the only available prenatal genetic tests for Down syndrome until the mid-1980s. More recently, a 
number of new prenatal screening tests have been developed. These tests are noninvasive, and they 
mostly consist of an ultrasound scan (nuchal translucency) and blood tests.7 The screening tests do 
not diagnose the presence of a chromosomal disorder, but they estimate the likelihood that the fetus 
carries certain genetic diseases. These tests are safe for the mother and the fetus, but they lack 
precision, as false positives or false negatives are possible. If the screening test is positive, the mother 
must decide whether to seek a definitive (but invasive and risky) diagnostic test.  
Most high-income countries offer prenatal genetic screening programs. However, there is significant 
heterogeneity across countries in policies, recommendations, and guidelines, and in program take-up 
results (Javaher et al. 2010). Moreover, variability in take-up rates for prenatal tests is explained by 
differences in service delivery across health systems, as well as socioeconomic traits and culture 
(Javaher et al. 2010; Palomaki et al. 2013; Vassy et al. 2014; Crombag et al. 2014).  
Beginning in the early 2000s, many countries implemented new rules to harmonize national and 
international policies,8 but the process is still underway (World Health Organization 2016). The 
Netherlands and Sweden show the lowest prenatal screening take-up rates (below 30 percent), while 
Denmark, France, Belgium, and Iceland have the highest (above 80 percent). The United States, the 
United Kingdom, Finland, and Italy are in between (between 60 and 70 percent), with large regional 
                                                          
7 The most common noninvasive screening test is the integrated test. It consists of two phases. The first phase (in the first 
trimester) involves an ultrasound scan (nuchal translucency) and blood tests (the concentration of a chemical called 
pregnancy-associated plasma protein A, PAPP-A). The second phase involves a blood test where the levels of three 
markers are measured (alpha-fetoprotein, free beta-hCG, unconjugated estriol). Results from the two phases, along with 
maternal age, are “integrated” to compute the risk for chromosomal anomalies for that baby. The integrated test will detect 
eight to nine out of ten pregnancies with chromosomal anomalies, whereas the triple test, consisting of phase 2 of the 
integrated test only, detects six out of ten. The last generation of noninvasive screening tests (NIPT, also called Non 
Invasive Prenatal Screening, NIPS or cell free DNA test - cfDNA) have become increasingly available since 2015. These 
tests are based on an analysis of small fragments of fetus DNA circulating in the mother’s blood. In the case of a high 
probability outcome, a diagnostic invasive follow-up test is still necessary. Our empirical analysis is based on data 
preceding the introduction of these new screening tests. 
8 Among the others, Boyd et al. (2008), EUROCAT (2010), Javaher et al. (2010), Crombag et al. (2014) and Vassy et al. 
(2014) survey some recent European national programs. Plachinski (2017) reviews US policies over the last twenty years. 
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differences within countries (Palomaki et al. 2013; Vassy et al. 2014; Crombag 2016). The picture 
for invasive diagnostic tests is even more fragmented because eligibility varies according to age or 
risk assessment of genetic disorders. For example, amniocentesis is routinely offered to women older 
than 35 in the United States, Germany, Sweden, Italy, and Spain, older than 38 in France and Norway, 
and older than 39 in Finland. In the United Kingdom, only women with a high detection rate, that is, 
a high risk of genetic disorder based on a screening test, have access to invasive diagnostic tests.     
2.2 Policy Reform 
Prenatal tests have been routinely offered to all pregnant women in Italy since 2001.9 Since then, a 
co-payment, set at the regional level, has been in place, which means that women across Italy must 
contribute to the cost of these tests. In 2009, the regional government of Piedmont introduced a reform 
of its co-payment scheme for prenatal screening tests.10 The new policy made the noninvasive 
screening tests free for women residing within the administrative borders of the region but maintained 
the co-payment for diagnostic tests. Prior to the 2009 reform, the co-payment was in the range of 
€27–€54 for noninvasive screening tests; for invasive tests, the co-payment was €160–€200 
depending on the specific test provided (the combined test, the triple test, or the integrated test, and 
the chorionic villus sampling or the amniocentesis).  Some exemptions from the co-payment 
requirement were available for the invasive diagnostic tests based on the risk of the pregnancy (i.e., 
if the mother was age 35 or older at the time of conception, there were other cases of chromosomal 
disorders among members of the family, or the mother had a positive screening test). After the 2009 
reform, the co-payment for the noninvasive screening tests was eliminated for all women. Nothing 
changed in the co-payment scheme for the invasive diagnostic tests: all women had to pay the co-
payment, with the only exception being for women with high-risk pregnancies.  
Pregnant women can access prenatal tests with a medical prescription from a midwife, a general 
practitioner (GP), or a gynecologist. The physician must obtain the pregnant woman’s informed 
consent to the genetic screening, and the information provided when obtaining consent must include 
the characteristics of the test (reliability), the methods of execution, and an exhaustive description of 
the test.  In the case a genetic problem is diagnosed, the physician gives information to the pregnant 
woman about how best to behave during pregnancy and care for the infant after birth, or about ending 
the pregnancy. In Italy, the voluntary termination of pregnancy (VTP) is allowed at the woman’s 
request, within gestational limits: it is freely available in the first trimester; it is conditional to save 
woman’s life and protect her physical and/or mental health during the second trimester; it is prohibited 
                                                          
9 Italian Department for Health, Ministerial Decree, September 10, 1998. 
10 In particular, two resolutions of the Regional Government (Delibere della Giunta Regionale) are relevant: n. 34-8769, 
May 12, 2008, and n. 38-11960, August 4, 2009. 
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in the third trimester. As prenatal tests are taken in the first trimester, VTP during the second trimester 
are those more directly linked to test outcomes. In Italy, according to data provided by the Italian 
Statistical Office (Istat), only a small share of all VTP occurs in the second trimester, but this share 
is increasing over time at the national level, probably because of greater use of prenatal diagnosis and 
the increase in maternal age. The share of second trimester VTP over total VTP was around 2.5% in 
2005 and raised to about 5.5% in 2018. Unfortunately, available data do not allow to distinguish about 
different potential motivations of the VTP: fetal genetic or non-genetic disorders following a test, 
severe illness of the mother, or other tragic events.  
Within our sample, only public hospitals offer prenatal tests because they are the only accredited 
institutions that satisfy the required international quality standards in the region (AReSS 2008). As 
only public hospitals can supply the tests, this rules out any monetary incentives for physicians to 
prescribe prenatal tests. The co-payment flows directly to the hospital, which is also partly paid by 
the regional government according to a predetermined rate. Physicians working outside the hospitals 
are paid by capitation, while those working within the hospital are salaried public employees.   
A woman’s participation in a prenatal program is voluntary and is based on her personal preferences, 
culture, social background, and medical information (Santalahti et al. 1998). The 2009 co-payment 
reform did not introduce any new information campaigns or guidelines for obstetricians and 
gynecologists. Additionally, there was no general advertisement outside the health care medical and 
administrative staff concerning the co-payment’s elimination.   
Policymakers justified the reform on two grounds. The first ground was efficiency. Screening tests 
are robust and efficient in detecting pregnancies at high risk of a genetic disorder. Public health 
authorities claimed that the take-up rate for these tests was low because the risk assessment was often 
based only on maternal age.11 Spurred by recent medical evidence (Wald et al. 2003; Malone et al. 
2005; Palomaki et al. 2006; Loane et al. 2013), public authorities aimed to increase the take-up of 
screening tests, which are characterized by lower costs and lower medical risks than diagnostic tests.  
The second basis for this change was equity: there was regional evidence of inequalities in the use of 
prenatal tests based on socioeconomic and cultural traits. This evidence is also supported by the 
medical literature (Dormandy et al. 2005; Fransen et al. 2010), which reports low take-up rates for 
some disadvantaged socioeconomic groups.  Thus, the aim of the new Piedmont policy was to achieve 
a higher take-up rate of prenatal screening tests and to mitigate inequalities in access to tests. 
                                                          
11 In a technical report, the Regional Health Agency (AReSS, 2008) states that a 90 percent take-up rate for prenatal 
screening tests is a viable, though ambitious, target in Piedmont. 
10 
 
3 Conceptual Framework: Demand for Screening and Diagnostic Tests 
To understand the possible effect of the reform on take-up rates, we consider a simple conceptual 
framework. Define (, ) as the proportion of women who do not undergo any test; (, ) 
as the proportion of women who undergo the noninvasive screening test; and (, )  as the 
proportion of women who undergo only the invasive diagnostic test, where  is the co-payment on 
the noninvasive screening test, and  is the co-payment for the invasive diagnostic test. 
Considering standard medical prescriptions, we assume that women who undergo the invasive 
diagnostic test first never also undergo the noninvasive screening test, since the invasive diagnostic 
test provides more accurate information than the noninvasive screening one. We also assume that out 
of (, ) who undergo the noninvasive screening test, a proportion 	 undergoes only the 
noninvasive test, while a proportion (1 − 	) also undergoes the invasive diagnostic test. The latter 
could include women who had a positive test result (conveying “bad news”) from the screening test 
who decide to follow up with the more invasive diagnostic test. 
The whole population can therefore be split into four groups, which could be interpreted as related to 
the demand for each of the tests, or for both tests: 
 (, )  do not undergo any test, 
 (, )  undergo only the invasive diagnostic test, 
 	 × (, )  undergo only the noninvasive screening test, 
 (1 − 	) × (, )  undergo both tests,  
where   +  + 	 + (1 − 	) = 1, so that  = 1 −  −  .    
Assume that / < 0,   / ≥ 0 : an increase in the co-payment for the noninvasive 
screening test reduces the proportion of women who undergo the noninvasive screening test; and an 
increase in the co-payment for the invasive diagnostic test increases the proportion of women 
undergoing the noninvasive screening test if the tests are substitutes. 
Similarly, / < 0,   / ≥ 0 : an increase in the co-payment for the invasive diagnostic  
test reduces the proportion of women who undergo only the invasive test; and an increase in the co-
payment for the noninvasive screening test increases the proportion of women who undergo the 
invasive diagnostic test if the tests are substitutes. 
How does the elimination of the co-payment for the noninvasive screening test affect the four groups 
identified above?  
1)  (	)/ < 0. The elimination of the co-payment for the noninvasive screening test increases 
the proportion of women who undergo only the noninvasive screening test. 
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2)  / ≥ 0. The elimination of the co-payment for the noninvasive screening test weakly 
reduces the proportion of women who undergo only the invasive diagnostic test. 
3) ((1 − 	))/ ≤ 0. The elimination of the co-payment for the noninvasive screening test 
weakly increases the proportion of women who undergo both tests. 
4) / = (1 − −)/ =  −/ − /. The elimination of the co-payment 
for the noninvasive screening test weakly decreases the proportion of women who do not undergo 
any test if the increase in the proportion of women who undergo the noninvasive screening test is 
higher than the decrease in the proportion of women who undergo the invasive diagnostic test.  
Finally, note that the elimination of the co-payment for the noninvasive screening tests always 
increases the proportion of the population undergoing the noninvasive screening test, , that is, the 
sum of those who undergo only the noninvasive test or both tests. The effect on the proportion 
undergoing the invasive diagnostic test, ( + (1 − 	)),  that is, the sum of those who undergo 
only the invasive test or both, is instead indeterminate and given by / + (1 − 	) / ≷
0. On one hand, the elimination of the co-payment for the noninvasive screening test encourages a 
reduction in the proportion of those who undergo only the invasive diagnostic test due to the 
substitution effect, (the first term above), but also increases the proportion of those who undergo both 
tests (the second term above), due to a higher proportion of positive test results (conveying “bad 
news”), which in turn induces more women to undergo the invasive test. These results therefore 
highlight the usefulness of splitting the whole population into four groups (i.e., no test, only 
noninvasive screening test, only invasive diagnostic test, both tests), rather than three groups (i.e., no 
test, noninvasive test, and invasive test). In the empirical section, we test these four predictions.  
4 Data 
4.1 Sources and sample definition 
We exploit the CEDAP (CErtificato Di Assistenza al Parto, literally “Delivery Certificate”) 
administrative archive. The Delivery Certificate was introduced by the Ministry of Health in 2001 
(Ministerial Decree n. 249, July 16, 2001). It allows officials to collect homogenous, comparable, and 
high-quality statistical data related to all births occurring in public and private hospitals or any other 
facility (e.g., midwifery units, birth centers, home births) in Italy. The midwife or the doctor who 
attended the birth is responsible for filing the form within ten days of the delivery. The compulsory 
certificate contains a rich set of variables about sociodemographic characteristics of the parent(s), the 
course of the pregnancy, labor, childbirth, and the health status of the newborn. The certificate also 
contains data on prenatal testing, in particular whether the mother underwent a prenatal test and which 
12 
 
type of prenatal tests. The certificate does not report the exact date the woman undergoes the prenatal 
test, neither the result of the test. The sources of all data in the certificate are medical records and 
official personal data, except for the socio-economic information (marital status, education level, and 
employment status) that are self-reported. 
Our data include women who actually give birth.12 The data cover around 98 percent of all births 
within the Region. Home births (representing 0.2 percent of total births), and deliveries in private 
hospitals (1.8 percent of total births) are excluded. 
We define our final sample according to the following criteria. First, we consider all women who 
became pregnant one year before or one year after the elimination of the co-payment, which occurred 
on October 1, 2009. They all delivered in one of the 32 public hospitals within the administrative area 
of Piedmont. We are primarily interested in the conception dates, which of course, is an estimate. In 
our sample, the calculation of the conception date is based on the gestational age of the fetus, which, 
in turn, is based on several fetal measures obtained at the first ultrasound exam. Ultrasound exams 
have an intrinsic error of up to five to seven days (Verloove et al. 1986). For this reason, we choose 
“week” as the observational unit for our forcing variable (i.e., the number of weeks from conception 
to/from the elimination of the co-payment). We then exclude women whose date of conception falls 
in the twelve weeks between the beginning of July 2009 and the end of September 2009. Since we do 
not observe the exact date when the women undergo the prenatal test, it may be that some of the 
women whose conception date falls in the period of July 2009 through September 2009 actually paid 
the co-payment, while some others did not pay it. Medical guidelines establish that screening tests 
are delivered between the 11th and the 13th gestational week, and we safely exclude pregnancies that 
are borderline with respect to the co-payment elimination policy.13 
The total number of observations at this step is 71,283 women conceiving 52 weeks before 1st July 
2009 and 52 weeks after the policy change, i.e. 1st October 2009. Then, we restrict our sample to 
nulliparous women who do not exhibit any pathological disorders during pregnancy (high blood 
pressure, diabetes, placenta praevia, psychological disease, familial occurrence of congenital 
malformation, etc.). Following previous literature, the exclusion of women who experienced past 
pregnancies (we excluded 32,950 observations here) allows us to avoid some confounding effects of 
                                                          
12 We do not have information on women terminating their pregnancy before delivery occurs. Pregnancies mainly end 
before delivery because of spontaneous abortions, or because of induced (or voluntary) abortions. In Piedmont, the former 
represents around 11 per cent of all pregnancies, while the latter about 15 percent of all pregnancies. Information is from 
Regione Piemonte, Assessorato Sanità. 
13 The exclusion of observations immediately surrounding the threshold is also known as “donut RDD” (see Barreca et al 
2011). However, our results are robust to the inclusion of all women; when all women are included, those who become 
pregnant between July and the end September 2009 are assumed to fall in the pre-policy period. Results are also robust 
to the exclusion of women whose conception dates fall within different time windows (e.g. from eight to sixteen weeks 
before the elimination of the co-payment). 
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the policy, as past experience may have a prominent role in the choice of prenatal tests (and prenatal 
care behavior, in general). The reason for excluding women with any pathological disorders (we 
exclude 5,504 observations) is to remove all women who, in the pre-2009 period, had access to free 
prenatal tests due to their high-risk pregnancies.14  
After applying our inclusion criteria, the final sample consists of 32,829 women: 52 percent of them 
became pregnant during the pre-reform period (17,053 women), while the remaining 48 percent 
became pregnant in the post-reform period (15,776 women). 
4.2 Variables definitions and summary statistics 
Our first set of dependent variables includes the prenatal tests take-up rates. Consistent with our 
conceptual framework, we consider the four following utilization rates: 
 No test (Pn): a binary indicator equal to one if the woman had no prenatal tests during her 
pregnancy, and zero otherwise; 
 Screening (noninvasive) test only (ZP): a binary indicator equal to one if the woman had only a 
noninvasive prenatal screening test, and zero otherwise; 
 Diagnostic (invasive) test only (P): a binary indicator equal to one if the woman had only an 
invasive diagnostic prenatal test, and zero otherwise; 
 Both tests ((1 − Z)P): a binary indicator equal to one if the woman had a  prenatal screening test 
followed by a diagnostic test, and zero otherwise. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the take-up rate of prenatal tests in the whole sample and in the 
pre- and post-policy periods. By comparing the pre-reform period to the post-reform period, the 
percentage of women taking up noninvasive screening tests increases by around 9 percentage points 
(from 62 percent in the pre-reform period to 71 percent in the post-reform one), while the rate of 
invasive diagnostic tests raises by less than 1 percentage point (from 6.7 percent to 7.3 percent). The 
percentage undergoing no tests decreases by 10 percentage points: from 28 percent to 18 percent after 
the policy change, while the take-up rate for those undergoing both tests only marginally increases 
(0.2 percentage points). 
The second set of dependent variables includes women’s and newborns’ health status. 
For the health status of mothers, we exploit information about lifestyle during pregnancy: weight gain 
during pregnancy, smoking, alcohol consumption, the use of folic acid, and hospital admissions 
during pregnancy. For the health status of the newborns, we use the following indicators, all measured 
                                                          
14 We also experiment with including these women (multiparous women and/or women with pathological conditions) in 
our estimated models, and the results do not qualitatively change. 
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at birth: newborn weight, length, and head circumference at birth, the Apgar scores after one minute 
and after five minutes from birth, a resuscitation binary indicator, preterm birth, and stillbirth. Table 
2 reports the summary statistics for the health outcomes of women (Panel A) and of newborns (Panel 
B). 
International guidelines provide guidance on the optimal weight gain during pregnancy (Institute of 
Medicine 2009). For a woman of normal weight, weight gain during pregnancy should not exceed 
11–13 kg (24–29 pounds). Excessive weight gain is associated with poor health outcomes such as 
hypertension, gestational diabetes, miscarriage, and delivery complications. In our analysis, we use 
two measures of weight gain: a continuous variable (Weight Gain in Pregnancy) expressed in kg, and 
a dichotomous variable of excessive weight gain (Weight Gain in Pregnancy>15 kg) equal to one if 
the weight gain during pregnancy is higher than 15 kg (see Currie et al. 2010). The average weight 
gain during pregnancy in our sample is 13.1 kg, with a lower average in the post-policy period (13 
kg) relative to the pre-policy year (13.2 kg). Around one quarter of women gain more than 15 kg; this 
proportion is slightly smaller in the post-policy period (23.5 percent versus 24.5 percent in the pre-
policy period). 
Smoking and consuming alcohol during pregnancy are both associated with health problems for the 
fetus, including growth problems and damage to the nervous system. In our sample we exploit two 
dummy variables for smoking and alcohol consumption. The variable “Smoke in Pregnancy” is equal 
to one if the woman declares during pregnancy that she smokes at least one cigarette per day, while 
the variable “Alcohol in Pregnancy” is equal to one if the woman acknowledges consuming at least 
12 g of alcohol per day (about one glass of wine per day) during her pregnancy. Around 7 percent of 
the sample smoke during pregnancy (7.1 percent in the pre-policy period and 7.5 percent in the post-
policy), and 4 percent consume alcohol (5.4 percent in the pre-policy period and 2.8 percent in the 
post-policy period).  
A deficiency of folic acid (a type of B vitamin) during pregnancy is related to fetal malformation, and 
folic acid supplements are recommended for all pregnant women and for women who plan to become 
pregnant. We consider a binary variable “Folic Acid in Pregnancy” equal to one if the prospective 
mother used folic acid during her pregnancy: 83 percent of women, on average, use folic acid during 
pregnancy, with a larger share in the post-policy period (86 percent versus 79 percent in the pre-
policy period). 
A dichotomous variable for hospital admissions during pregnancy is defined as equal to one if the 
woman experiences one or more hospital admissions during pregnancy. Around 4 percent of women 
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experience hospitalization at least once during the pregnancy. The average share is larger in the post-
policy period (3.5 percent pre-policy versus 3.9 percent post-policy).  
Birth weight is a widely accepted measure of newborn well-being and a low birth weight is associated 
with a higher probability of mortality and morbidity, both in the short and long runs (e.g. Almond et 
al. 2005). We follow the World Health Organization’s definition of “Low weight” as a binary 
variable, equal to one if the birth weight is below kg 2.5 (roughly 5.5 pounds). On average 5.5 percent 
of newborns have low birth weight. Similarly, the newborns’ length and head circumference are 
related to their well-being. The average length is around 49.5 centimeters (19.5 inches), while the 
average head circumference is 34 centimeters (13.4 inches).  
The Apgar score is a common measure of the physical condition of a newborn. The Apgar score, 
when measured at one minute after birth, assess how well the infant tolerated the birthing process, 
while the Apgar score measured at five minutes after birth assesses how well the infant is adapting to 
life outside the womb. The score ranges from 0 (no vitality) to 10 (high vitality) and is measured by 
doctors and nurses by points for heart rate, respiratory effort, muscle tone, response to stimulation, 
and skin coloration. Apgar scores have been found to be predictive of health status, cognitive ability, 
and children’s behavioral problems (Almond et al. 2005; Figlio et al. 2014). In our sample we define 
two “Low Apgar Score” indicators, at one and at five minutes, as binary variables equal to one if the 
Apgar score is below 9. In our sample, 20 percent and 5.5 percent of newborns have low Apgar scores 
after one minute and after five minutes, respectively.  
The resuscitation binary indicator is equal to one if a resuscitation method (drugs, intubation, cardiac 
massage, or oxygen at birth) was necessary after birth. In our sample, a resuscitation method was 
used in 3.4 percent of deliveries.  
The preterm binary indicator is equal to one if the birth occurred before the 37th gestational week. A 
premature birth is a strong predictor of mortality and morbidity and is associated with poor health 
(Borra et al. 2016). We observe preterm birth in 5.4 percent of newborns.  
Finally, stillbirth (death of the infant immediately before or during delivery) occurs in 0.3 percent of 
deliveries. 
In all specifications we include the following information about the woman: age, education level, 
employment status, the employment status of her partner, marital status, whether she had a twin 
pregnancy, previous miscarriages and abortions, residence, and nationality. 
Table A1 in the Appendix provides a detailed description of all of the women’s characteristics we 
consider, while Table A2 shows some summary statistics. Around one-third of women are between 
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ages 30–34 years old when they conceive, 17 percent are younger than age 25, 28 percent are ages 
25– 29, and the remaining 21 percent are older than 35. While 50 percent of women have a “medium” 
level of education (high school), 28 percent of the sample have a “low” level of education 
(compulsory education or less), and the remaining 22 percent have a “high” level of education 
(tertiary education or more). In the post-policy period we observe a higher rate of women with high 
education (23 percent in the post-policy period versus 20 percent in the pre-policy period) and a lower 
percentage of women with low education (27 percent in the post-policy period versus 29 percent in 
the pre-policy period). Around 70 percent of women are employed, and 60 percent are married. More 
than three-quarters of women are Italian nationals. A working father is observed in 90 percent of 
cases, while twin pregnancies occur in 1 percent of the sampled women. The proportion of women 
who experienced past miscarriages and abortions is about 12 percent and 8 percent, respectively. 
Women living in metropolitan areas15 represent around 40 percent of the sample. The proportion 
living in metropolitan areas slightly increases in the post-policy period (41 percent post-policy versus 
37 percent pre-policy).  
Concern about inequalities in access to prenatal tests was one of the reasons policymakers gave for 
eliminating the co-payment. Table 3 shows descriptive evidence about the proportion of women who 
did not undergo any prenatal tests across several demographic and socioeconomic traits of mothers. 
For all age groups, the proportion of women who do not undergo any test decreases by about 10 
percentage points after the policy change. The proportion undergoing prenatal tests increases with 
age; this is consistent with medical guidelines promoting these tests for older mothers, given their 
increased risk of giving birth to babies with congenital defects. 
The proportion of women with low education who do not undergo any test decreases by about 11 
percentage points in the post-policy period, while for women with medium and high education, the 
proportion decreases by 9 percentage points and 8 percentage points, respectively.  
Native and foreign women react to the policy change in a similar way, and the proportion not 
undergoing any test decreases by 10 percentage points for both groups. Finally, the reduction is larger 
for women living in metropolitan areas relative to nonmetropolitan areas. 
                                                          
15 Metropolitan areas are defined by the metropolitan area of Torino—the regional capital—and of the other seven largest 
towns of the region (provincial capitals). Each metropolitan area includes the municipality of a medium-large town and 
the neighboring municipalities, which depend on the main town for most services (healthcare, education, etc.). This may 
cause difficulties in accessing the services due to user congestion and possible deficiencies in the connections between 
the center and the periphery (e.g., poor public transit systems), especially for those citizens living in the suburbs.   
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5 Estimation Strategy 
Our estimation strategy is twofold. First, we test the effect of eliminating the co-payment on the take-
up of prenatal tests and the extent to which the effect differs by socioeconomic status. Second, we 
investigate whether the variation in the utilization of prenatal tests affects mothers’ health behaviors 
during pregnancy (weight gain, smoking, alcohol consumption, folic acid supplements, 
hospitalization) and newborns’ health outcomes (birth weight, body length, head circumference, 
Apgar scores, resuscitation, preterm birth, and stillbirth).  
5.1 Prenatal tests take-up rates 
To analyze the effect of eliminating the co-payment on prenatal tests utilization, we adopt an RDD 
approach. We use time, measured in weeks, as the forcing variable (e.g. Ito 2015; Halla et al. 2016; 
Hausman and Rapson 2018). In this study, the time threshold determines eligibility for the elimination 
of the co-payment for prenatal screening tests. The eligibility rule has three key features. First, women 
who become pregnant after the threshold date (the policy change) are automatically eligible, while 
those becoming pregnant before the threshold date are ineligible.16 Second, the co-payment was 
eliminated shortly before the cutoff date: a general announcement was made in May 2008, but the 
detailed rules were not set forth until August 2009, which almost coincides with the start of the new 
policy (October 1,  2009). Third, the price of prenatal tests (€27–€54) represents a negligible portion 
of the cost of raising a child. We can reasonably rule out that women strategically delay pregnancy 
to avoid the co-payment. Having a child is a momentous decision that involves careful consideration 
of many factors. It follows that the pregnancy decision is exogenous with respect to the threshold date 
that generates a discontinuity in the treatment assignment.  
Our sample includes women at the date of conception. If the conception date falls in the post-policy 
period, the woman is automatically enrolled in the program and she can obtain a screening test for 
free. The time threshold simply determines which eligibility rule was in effect. Since we plausibly 
exclude strategic behavior (women do not delay/anticipate pregnancy as a consequence of the co-
payment elimination), our identification is based on asymptotics in N, the number of cross sectional 
units around the threshold, rather than asymptotics in T, the number of data points in time. This allows 
us to exploit the standard cross-sectional RD toolkit (Ito 2015; Hausman and Rapson 2018). 
                                                          
16 We could perform our analysis using an interrupted time series (ITS) (Kontopantelis et al. 2015) or an event-study. We 
are dealing with a health policy targeted at the population level, so we lack a clean control group. Hence, in principle, 
both ITS and the event-study approach would not be ill-suited. However, note that unlike an ITS, our main unit of analysis 
is the individual woman and not a “time frequency” (e.g., daily observations). The main identification assumption is that 
both before and after the policy change, women only differ in eligibility. 
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There are two main strategies for specifying the functional form to estimate the magnitude of the 
discontinuity in the outcome at the cutoff point within a classical RD setting: the parametric approach 
and the nonparametric approach (Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee and Lemieux 2010). The main 
difference is in the way data around the cutoff are used: while the parametric approach focuses on the 
optimal functional form to fit the full set of data, most nonparametric approaches search for the 
optimal data bandwidth where a linear regression function can produce a consistent estimate. 
We mainly apply a parametric approach and we fit flexible parametric functions to data within a one-
year interval around the cutoff point (conception dates 52 weeks before and 52 weeks after the policy 
implementation). As a robustness check, we also implement a number of local linear and polynomial 
(up to the fourth order) nonparametric specifications (Calonico et al. 2014, 2015, 2018) where we use 
a range of different methods to choose the “optimal” bandwidth (Imbens and Lemieux 2008; Lee and 
Lemieux 2010; Calonico et al. 2015).  
The parametric specification is as follows: 
(1)  =  + !" + ∑ $(% − %
∗)$'$() +  ∑ *$" × (% − %
∗)$'$() + +, + - 
where K can take the following values K = 1, 2, 3, 4. We define the dependent variable  as a binary 
indicator identifying in turn each of the four possible utilization rates classified in our conceptual 
framework in Section 3. First, the dependent variable  is equal to one if woman i undergoes no test 
(), and zero otherwise. Then, we re-estimate equation (1) by using as dependent variable  , which 
is equal to one if woman i undergoes only the noninvasive subsidized screening test (	), and zero 
otherwise. In order to assess the presence of substitution effects, we also estimate equation (1) after 
replacing  with a variable equal to one if woman i undergoes only the invasive diagnostic test (
), 
and zero otherwise. Finally,  equals one if woman i undergoes both types of test ((1 − 	)
), and 
zero otherwise.   
% is the (presumed) conception date for woman i, while %
∗ is the cutoff date. The difference (% − %
∗) 
measures the number of weeks between the conception date and the cutoff date. " is the treatment 
assignment dummy variable, the primary variable of interest: it takes a value of one in the post-policy 
period (A/ = 1 if C/ ≥ C
∗), and zero otherwise. The coefficient ! is our key coefficient of interest and 
gives us the change in the likelihood of undergoing the prenatal test at % = %
∗. 
+ is a vector of observable characteristics of woman i such as age, highest education level, parents’ 
employment status, marital status, twin pregnancy, previous miscarriages and abortions, area of 
residence, and nationality. - is the error term.  
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Throughout, we cluster the standard errors at the level of the mother’s district of residence–quarter 
of conception, to account for any correlation within the clusters.17 The Piedmont territory is divided 
into 14 Local Health Authorities (LHA, Aziende Sanitarie Locali), and each authority is responsible 
for providing health services in its assigned geographical area or district. Moreover, we observe 
mothers over ten quarters. By interacting the two variables (district of residence or LHA of the woman 
and quarter of conception), we obtain 138 clusters of data.18 
Identification of the model requires no self-selection at the cutoff and no discontinuous differences 
in the characteristics of women at the cutoff date. We discuss both issues in Section 6.1 below. To 
address heterogeneity issues, we also estimate equation (1) for a set of subsamples of mothers 
according to their demographic and socioeconomic characteristics (age, level of education, 
nationality, and area of residence). 
5.2 Women’s and newborns’ health outcomes 
Prenatal care may affect the health of both the mother-to-be and the newborn. Prenatal care may affect 
the health of mothers directly, for example, through hypertension, hospitalizations, or mental health 
(Yan 2017), but also indirectly, through a change in lifestyle (Conway and Kutinova 2006) or the 
decision to voluntarily terminate pregnancy (Natoli et al., 2012, Jacobs et al., 2016). Lack of prenatal 
care is also associated with poor birth outcomes, such as low birth weight, preterm birth and infant 
mortality (Woodhouse et al. 2014; Currie and Rossin-Slater 2015; Corman et al. 2018).  
We analyze whether the take-up of prenatal tests, which is a measure of prenatal care use,19 has any 
consequences on health behaviors during pregnancy or on newborns’ health. Specifically, we 
investigate whether improved access to prenatal screening tests has downstream effects on the health 
outcomes of women and newborns. These effects might be explained by the behavioral channel of 
the new policy improving prenatal care (e.g. through a greater use of related prenatal care services, 
Metcalfe et al. 2013), which in turn affects health outcomes.  
Our dataset includes information related to lifestyle during pregnancy: weight gain, smoking, 
consuming alcohol, using folic acid, and hospitalization20. We measure the general health of 
                                                          
17 In terms of standard errors, the results are qualitatively similar when we cluster by week of conception, that is, the 
measurement unit of the conception date Ci, as suggested by Lee and Card (2008) for discrete running variables. 
18 The data span from the first week of July 2008 to the first week of October 2010 (with the exclusion of the data from 
July through September 2009, see footnote 12), that is, the ten quarters from the third quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter 
of 2010. There are no observations in two clusters. 
19 Other prenatal care measures include the number of prenatal care visits, the delay in initiating prenatal care, prenatal 
education, and the number and type of prenatal tests and scans (Currie and Rossin-Slater 2015; Corman et al. 2018). 
Unfortunately, our dataset does not contain any of these measures.  
20
 Since we do not have information on pregnancies ending without a delivery, we are unable to provide an analysis of 
the impact of the policy of VTP. However, we discuss below aggregate regional data on VTP during the second trimester 
from which no effect can be found when the reform kicks in. 
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newborns at delivery by birth weight, length, head circumference, Apgar scores, whether the newborn 
was resuscitated, premature birth, and stillbirth. 
We estimate the following regression model on the sample of women and newborns: 
(2) 12 = 3 + 3) + 34(% − %
∗) + 35" × (% − %
∗) + +η + 7    
where the health status 12 of the infant/mother i depends on , a dummy variable equal to one if the 
mother had prenatal screening tests, and zero otherwise. In the specification we also include the 
distance to the cutoff point (% − %
∗), the treatment assignment dummy " interacted with the 
distance to the cutoff point (% − %
∗), and the full set of mother characteristics +, from equation (1). 
We analyze this relationship within a fuzzy RD design (Lee and Lemieux 2010). Utilization of 
prenatal tests is voluntary, and it is usually based on a woman’s preferences and sociocultural 
background. Self-selection into prenatal care may bias our results upward if more-diligent and 
healthier women are more likely to use prenatal care, or downward if women expecting worse health 
demand more prenatal care. We tackle this issue using a 2SLS strategy where the instrumental 
variable for prenatal test utilization is the discontinuity in the eligibility of free prenatal screening 
tests triggered by the new policy. The policy that eliminated the co-payment affects the probability 
of undergoing a prenatal test, but it does not directly affect health outcomes and therefore offers 
exogenous variation that we exploit in 2SLS estimation. Equation (2) is thus estimated via 2SLS, 
where the first stage is: 
 =  + !" + )(% − %
∗) + *" × (% − %
∗) + +, + -, 
which is equation (1) with 8 = 1, that is, the linear specification. The coefficient of interest is 3) in 
equation (2), which gives a measure of the causal effects of prenatal test utilization on women’ health-
related behaviors and newborns’ health. More specifically, we measure the average causal effect of 
screening tests on compliers, that is, the subpopulation of women randomly assigned to treatment (the 
co-payment elimination group) who comply with the assignment by undergoing a screening test.21 
Finally, we investigate heterogeneous effects by estimating equation (2) for subsamples of mothers 
based on age, education, nationality, and area of residence. 
                                                          
21 Our setting is characterized by partial compliance. The population can be divided into three subgroups: (i) compliers: 
women randomly assigned to treatment, who comply with it by undergoing a prenatal test; (ii) always-takers: women 
who are not assigned to treatment, who do undergo the prenatal test; (iii) never-takers: women randomly assigned to 
treatment, who do not undergo a prenatal test. Our IV strategy allows us to identify the effect of prenatal tests on the 
group of compliers (see Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
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6 Estimation Results 
6.1 Statistical tests and descriptive evidence 
We present two sets of statistical tests: sorting of women around the cutoff and balancing tests for the 
comparability of women around the cutoff. First, we test for strategic manipulation of the conception 
date: if women nonrandomly sort themselves around the cutoff date, for example, by delaying the 
conception date to obtain free access to the noninvasive screening test, the continuity assumption of 
average potential outcomes does not hold and the causal effect is not identified. We perform several 
statistical tests for the presence of any discontinuities in the density around the cutoff date based on 
local-polynomial density estimation techniques (McCrary 2008; Cattaneo et al. 2018). We do not find 
any statistically significant evidence of manipulation. We find no discontinuities in the density of 
women conceiving around the cutoff date, which supports the absence of self-selection or nonrandom 
sorting of women into control and treatment groups.22  
Next, we test for changes in the observable characteristics of women around the cutoff date, and 
therefore check the smoothness of the control variables around the policy change date. Table A3 in 
the Appendix reports the estimated coefficients for the treatment assignment dummy only. None of 
the characteristics of mothers show any statistically significant discrete jump at the cutoff date (except 
for past miscarriages). Figure A2 in the Appendix plots the observed characteristics of pregnant 
women against the conception week, relative to the eligibility cutoff date. Also from graphical 
inspection, we find that observable mothers’ characteristics are smoothly distributed around the cutoff 
date.  
Finally, we present graphical evidence for our outcomes. Figure 1 plots the four prenatal tests 
utilization rates of the four prenatal tests against the assignment variable, that is, number of weeks 
separating the conception date from the cutoff date. The y-axis measures the proportion of women 
undergoing no prenatal tests (top-left panel), a screening test only (top-right panel), a diagnostic test 
only (bottom-left panel), and both a screening and a diagnostic test (bottom-right panel). The x-axis 
reports (% − %
∗), that is, the number of weeks between the conception date for woman i % , and the 
cutoff date %∗. The zero value represents the cutoff date of the policy change. All women whose 
conception date falls before the cutoff, do not access free prenatal screening tests, while all women 
whose conception date falls after the cutoff can access for free the noninvasive screening prenatal 
test.  
                                                          
22 Figure A1 in the Appendix shows the density distribution (histogram) of women around the cutoff date. 
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If the elimination of the co-payment had an effect, we expect a discontinuous jump in the utilization 
of prenatal tests at the cutoff date. Figure 1 documents a clear discontinuity in the probability of 
undergoing prenatal tests as a function of the conception date in two out of four groups. In particular, 
in the first two top panels of Figure 1, there is a discontinuous change in the utilization rates at the 
cutoff point: we observe a reduction in the probability of undergoing no prenatal tests after the 
program implementation and an increase in the take-up rate for noninvasive screening tests. For the 
proportion of diagnostic tests and of both tests (two bottom panels of Figure 1) we do not observe 
any significant change at the cutoff date.  
6.2 Effect on prenatal tests take-up 
Table 4 presents the RDD estimates for the effect of the elimination of the co-payment on the 
probability of undergoing prenatal tests. Results are based on the estimation of equation (1) by OLS 
on the whole sample of nulliparous women who become pregnant within a time bandwidth of 52 
weeks around the policy intervention. Standard errors are clustered at the level of the district of 
residence (LHA)–quarter of conception of the mother (138 clusters); the specification is linear. We 
first estimate the effect of the policy change on the decision to undergo a prenatal test or not (outcome 
“No test,” in column 1). We then estimate separately the effect on the probability of undergoing a 
screening test (column 2), a diagnostic test (column 3), and both screening and diagnostic tests 
(column 4). 
The results show that the policy had a positive statistically significant effect on the utilization rate, 
and this effect is mainly due to screening test take-up rates. The coefficient for the treatment 
assignment variable " is negative and statistically significant in column 1: the probability of 
undergoing no prenatal tests decreases by around 7 percentage points after the elimination of the co-
payment. We also control for observable characteristics in all specifications. Women who are older, 
more educated, employed, and native show a higher probability of undergoing prenatal tests. 
Similarly, we find a significantly higher probability of undergoing tests for women who experienced 
past miscarriages and abortions. Married women and women living in metropolitan areas have a 
higher probability of undergoing no prenatal tests. 
In column 2 of Table 4, we find that after the elimination of the co-payment, the probability of 
undergoing a noninvasive screening test increases by 6.5 percentage points. The probability of having 
an invasive diagnostic test only, and the probability of undergoing a screening test followed by a 
diagnostic test, are not affected by the policy.  
We extend our baseline results on several dimensions as robustness checks. First, we introduce 
higher-order polynomial parametric specifications. Table A4 in the Appendix shows OLS estimation 
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results for equation (1) with different nonlinear trends (quadratic, cubic, and quartic in columns 1, 2, 
and 3, respectively). The policy triggered an increase in the take-up of prenatal tests (by 9 to 11 
percentage points) that is due to the increase in the probability of undergoing screening tests by around 
9 percentage points. Diagnostic tests are not affected by the treatment assignment. 
Second, we assess the robustness to different bandwidth choices around the cutoff date. Table A5 in 
the Appendix shows that the main results are unchanged, with both halving the bandwidth to 26 weeks 
and doubling the bandwidth to 104 weeks around the cutoff date.  
Third, we estimate several local linear and polynomial (up to the fourth order) nonparametric 
specifications. Table A6 in the Appendix reports results for the nonparametric estimation method 
proposed by Calonico et al. (2014), where we allow for the selection of the optimal bandwidth by the 
MSE-optimal bandwidth selector, and the standard errors are still clustered robustly at the level of 
district of residence (LHA)–quarter of conception.  Coefficients are similar in size to the OLS results 
in Table 4 and Table A4. Reassuringly, the results are robust to polynomial specifications of higher- 
order (third-order and quartic-order) polynomials. We find that after the policy change, the probability 
of undergoing no test significantly decreases by around 9 to 10 percentage points, while the take-up 
rate for screening tests significantly increases by 8 percentage points. There is no significant change 
for women who undergo only the diagnostic test or both tests. 
Finally, Figure A3 in the Appendix presents a falsification test. We artificially move cutoff date 
backwards to verify that the treatment assignment effect is zero at some placebo thresholds. We do 
not find any evidence of significant discontinuity before the policy was actually implemented. 
Overall, our evidence points to an increase in the take-up rate of screening tests following the 
elimination of the co-payment: the probability that a woman undergoes any prenatal tests increases 
by 7 to 10 percentage points depending on the considered specification. This result is driven by the 
increase in the take-up of screening tests (by 7 to 9 percentage points). Evaluated at the average pre-
policy rate of 62 percent, the policy increased the take-up rate for screening tests by 11 to 15 percent. 
However, as the elimination of the co-payment did not affect the utilization rate for the riskier and 
costlier diagnostic tests, we do not find evidence of any substitution effects.  
6.3 Heterogeneity and long-run effects 
In this section we explore whether the policy had more pronounced effects on prenatal test take-up 
among specific subgroups who differ by age, education, nationality, and residence. Then, we assess 
whether the effects of the policy persist over time.  
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We split the sample of mothers into four age groups based on the date of conception: 18–24, 25–29, 
30–34, or over 35 years. Women who are 35 years old or older at conception have free access to 
invasive diagnostic prenatal tests, because they are considered at high risk of congenital disorders. 
The elimination of the co-payment for this age group was introduced at the national level in 2001, 
which was well before the period we study (2008–2010). After the elimination of the co-payment for 
screening tests, the over-35 women had free access to any screening or diagnostic prenatal tests. We 
are particularly interested in testing whether this group of older women changed any testing behavior 
after the policy change given the higher possibility of a substitution effect between the invasive and 
the noninvasive tests as they both became fully subsidized.  
Table 5 shows the results for the OLS estimation of equation (1) on different subsamples of women 
according to their age at conception. Standard errors are clustered at the level of district of residence–
quarter of conception. The odd-numbered columns show the linear specifications, and the even 
numbered columns the quadratic ones. 
In columns 1 to 2 of Table 5, we find that the probability that a woman does not undergo any test 
decreases by 7 to 10 percentage points if she is below age 35 at conception. Columns 3 and 4 show 
that this result is coupled with a higher probability of screening tests, which increases by 7 to 11 
percentage points. No statistically significant change occurred to the probability of undergoing 
diagnostic tests or both tests. For the 18–24 age group, the sign and the magnitude of the coefficients 
are similar to the 25–29 and 30–34 age groups, but the standard errors are larger, possibly due to 
smaller sample sizes.   
We find that for women who are 35 or older at conception, the probability of undergoing any prenatal 
test increases by 8 to 9 percentage points (columns 1 and 2 of Table 5). However, unlike other age 
groups, this effect is not completely determined by the increase in the noninvasive screening tests. 
Both the take-up rates of screening tests (columns 3 and 4 of Table 5) and of diagnostic tests (columns 
5 and 6 of Table 5) increase after the policy implementation, even if neither of the effects is 
statistically significant. A possible rationalization of this result is a behavioral response to the 
subsidized screening test by women who also have free access to subsidized diagnostic tests (Cohen 
et al. 2015). After the elimination of the co-payment, women may be more prone to collect additional 
information about prenatal tests in general. Women with higher risks, for whom all prenatal tests are 
free, end up choosing the conclusive diagnostic invasive test more frequently. 
To further explore the effect of the policy on the testing behavior of women over 35, we consider a 
smaller subsample defined by those women who are 32–38 years old at conception. As a preliminary 
step, we also check in this case whether there is any discontinuity in the distribution of age around 
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the age-35 threshold. We perform a number of statistical manipulation tests (Cattaneo et al. 2018), 
and find no statistical evidence of systematic discontinuity in the density of mothers’ age at 
conception.23 At the bottom of Table 5, we present estimation results for equation (1) where the 
treatment assignment dummy variable " is entered both linearly and interacted with the binary 
indicator Age Group 35+ (see Lalive 2008 for a similar exercise). The main finding is that prenatal 
test take-up increases after the policy; this is mostly explained by a higher probability of undergoing 
a screening test (columns 1–4 of Table 5, coefficients for the Treatment Assignment " variable). We 
do not observe any statistically significant difference in the policy effects for women older than 35, 
as the interaction term is never statistically significant in all columns of Table 5. Finally, we observe 
that when a woman turns 35, the probability of a screening test decreases, while the probability of a 
diagnostic test increases (by 12–13.5 percentage points, columns 5–6 of Table 5, coefficient for the 
binary variable Age Group 35+). We do not find evidence of substitution effects as the elimination 
of the co-payment did not affect the utilization for the riskier diagnostic tests.  
In Table 6 we further investigate whether mothers with different educational backgrounds respond 
differently to the elimination of the co-payment. We find that the probability of women with a low 
level of education undergoing prenatal tests increases by 7 to 10 percentage points (columns 1–2 of 
Table 6). For women with a medium level of education, we find a significant increase of 8 to 12 
percentage points. For women with high levels of education, we find an increase by only 5 to 6 
percentage points (though only the linear specification is statistically significant). We find a 
statistically significant increase in the take-up rate of noninvasive screening tests only for women 
with a medium level of education (7 to 10 percentage points). The increase in the probability of 
undergoing a screening test is lower (from 5 to 6 percentage points) but imprecisely estimated for 
both low- and high-education groups, possibly because of the smaller samples. Overall, most of the 
impact of the elimination of the co-payment is among women with a medium level of education. 
Table 6 also considers heterogeneity in women’s responses according to nationality and area of 
residence. We find that non-natives have a significantly higher response rate for noninvasive 
screening tests (9 to 15 percentage points) relative to Italians (6 to 7 percentage points). Similarly, 
women in metropolitan areas have a significantly higher response rate for screening tests, by 12 to 16 
percentage points, while there is no significant response by women in non-metropolitan areas. These 
results are important, as the elimination of the co-payment was justified on equity grounds in addition 
                                                          
23 Figure A1 – Panel B in the Appendix also shows the density distribution (histogram) of women’s ages around the 
cutoff. This is not surprising as the presumed conception date is only partially based on a woman’s report. The definitive 
estimated conception date is defined by the physician on the basis of a number of fetus measures at the first ultrasound 
exam. This estimation is accurate as it allows for the calculation of the “gestational age,” which is a fundamental parameter 
for a safe and healthy pregnancy (Verloove et al. 1986). Its manipulation would be considered serious medical negligence. 
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to efficiency grounds. The larger response for foreign women and those living in a metropolitan area 
(characterized by lower utilization rates pre-policy, see Table 3) is fully consistent with the intentions 
of the policy. 
We finally examine whether the policy had a persistent impact given that the co-payment elimination 
remained in effect in the following years. We re-estimate equation (1) by using two subsequent years 
as treatment assignment periods (Ito 2015). To estimate the policy effect in one year from its 
implementation, we substitute the original post-policy data with the sample of women becoming 
pregnant between October 2010 and October 2011 and we define ", the corresponding treatment 
assignment variable, to be equal to one in this specific post-policy period, and zero otherwise. 
Similarly, for the effect two years from the implementation, we include data from October 2011 to 
October 2012, and we redefine the treatment assignment variable ". Table 7 shows the results. When 
we consider the period of October 2010–October 2011 as the post-policy period, we find that the 
results are similar to those in Table 4 and Table A4: after the elimination of the co-payment, there is 
a reduction in the rate of those who undergo no tests (6.5 to 7.5 percentage points, columns 1–2 in 
Table 7) and an increase in the rate of screening tests (8 to 10 percentage points, columns 3–4 in 
Table 7).  
Results for the post-policy period of October 2011–October 2012 are larger and highly significant: 
the take-up rate of any prenatal test increases by 11–13 percentage points, and correspondingly, the 
probability of undergoing a screening test increases by 12–14 percentage points. We do not find any 
effects on the probability of undergoing a diagnostic test (columns 5–6 of Table 7). This evidence 
indicates that the co-payment elimination had persistent effects, inducing more women to take 
prenatal screening tests over time. There is no evidence of statistically significant substitution effects 
with diagnostic tests even in the long run.  
6.4 Effects on women’s and newborn health  
As a final step, we turn to the analysis of the effects of prenatal tests on women’s and newborn health 
outcomes. Given that the co-payment reform had an effect especially on the take-up of screening 
tests, we focus our analysis on the impact of this test on health outcomes. Given the endogenous 
nature of the utilization decision, we adopt a 2SLS approach, where the “Screening Test” dummy is 
instrumented by the policy threshold considering a fuzzy RDD specification, as described in Section 
5.2. Results are reported in Tables 8 and 9, for women’s and newborns’ health outcomes respectively. 
OLS estimates for the coefficient of the “Screening Test” dummy are shown at the bottom of Tables 
8 and 9. When we do not account for self-selection into prenatal care, we find significant positive 
effects on folic acid supplements and significant negative effects on alcohol consumption during 
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pregnancy as far as women’s behavior is concerned, and significant negative effects of the screening 
test on almost all newborn health outcomes (except for newborn length and stillbirth). 
The policy threshold is a strong predictor of the take-up decision (as we already know from the 
estimation results of equation (1) in previous sections), and it is clearly exogenous with respect to 
health outcomes. The F-test on the excluded instrument in the first stage (reported at the bottom of 
Tables 8 and 9) is always larger than 30. 
When controlling for endogeneity, we find an upward bias in the OLS coefficients in the mother 
equations, and a downward bias in the OLS coefficients in the newborn equations. Considering Table 
8 first, we find that screening tests significantly reduce mothers’ weight gain during pregnancy, their 
alcohol consumption, and the probability of hospitalization during pregnancy (columns 1, 4, and 6 of 
Table 8). In particular, undergoing a screening test reduces weight gain during pregnancy by 4 kg 
(roughly 8.8 pounds), about one standard deviation. Screening tests also reduce the probability of 
drinking during pregnancy by 2.5 percentage points when evaluated at the sample mean of the pre-
policy period (Table 2 – Panel A). Screening tests also reduce the probability of any hospital 
admissions during the pregnancy by 1.7 percentage points when evaluated at the sample mean value 
of the pre-policy period (Table 2 – Panel A). 24 We do not find any significant effect of prenatal tests 
on the probability of weight gain larger than 15 kg, on smoking, and on folic acid supplements during 
pregnancy (columns 2, 3, and 5 of Table 8). Once we account for the self-selection of women, our 
results show that the take-up of a screening test triggers higher attention to nutrition by prospective 
mothers. At least for the impact on weight gain and hospitalizations, our results appear to be consistent 
with previous evidence on the benefits of prenatal care provided in the United States within the 
Medicaid system (Conway and Kutinova 2006). 
Table 9 presents the 2SLS results for equation (2) on newborn health, measured by low birth weight, 
newborn length, and head circumference (columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively); low Apgar Scores 
(columns 4 and 5); resuscitation (column 6); preterm (column 7), and stillbirth (column 8). We do 
not find any causal effect of the prenatal screening test take-up decision on newborn health, 
confirming the results from previous studies carried out for other healthcare systems with different 
institutional settings (e.g. Shurtz et al. 2016, for Israel; Plachinski 2017 and Sandner et al. 2018, for 
the United States). 
                                                          
24
 For the the ‘Screening test’ coefficients, Tables 8 and 9 report the original p-values and the “adjusted” p-values (the 
sharpened False Discovery Rate, FDR, q-values by Anderson, 2008), to account for multiple testing hypothesis. Given 
the large number of measured outcomes (14), there are some concerns about multiple inference, as significant coefficients 
may emerge simply by chance, even if there are no treatment effects. The only outcome that is significant, even after 
accounting for the conservative multiple hypothesis testing adjustment, is the hospitalization during pregnancy. 
28 
 
We assess the robustness of the results on the subsamples of women based on education, nationality, 
and residence (figures A4 and A5 in the Appendix). We find large and significant effects of screening 
tests among women with a medium level of education, who are native born, and who live in 
metropolitan areas. The largest weight gain reduction is found in the subsample of women with a 
medium level of education. The screening test reduces the probability of consuming alcohol during 
pregnancy, especially among Italian-born women. The reduction in the probability of hospitalization 
during pregnancy is particularly large again among Italian-born women, mothers with a medium level 
of education, and women living in metropolitan areas. We do not find any effect of the prenatal 
screening tests on newborns’ health in any subsample (Figure A5 in the Appendix). 
Finally, one important outcome for women’s and newborn health is whether the increase in the take-
up of screening tests did affect also the number of voluntary terminations of pregnancy (VTP). 
Screening tests – whether positive – require to take diagnostic tests to diagnose the presence of 
chromosomal anomalies; however, we do not find evidence of an impact of the co-payment reform 
on this second type of tests. In addition, the literature finds evidence of a decline in the likelihood to 
terminate pregnancy after a diagnosis of genetic disorder over the years. Natoli et al. (2012) notice 
that termination rates following a prenatal diagnosis of Down syndrome have been decreasing in 
recent years in the US. Looking at Scottish data, Jacobs et al. (2016) observe that advances in prenatal 
screening have improved detection rates for aneuploidy (including trisomy), and this has been 
accompanied by a reduction in termination rates.  Unfortunately, our data do not allow a formal 
econometric testing of this issue. However, we collected monthly data on the number of all VTP, that 
occurred during the second trimester of pregnancy, within the administrative borders of Piedmont, 
between July 2008 and October 2010. The source of data is the Italian Statistical Office (Istat). We 
also compute the abortion ratio equal to the number of VTP to total number of births. Figure 2 shows 
the fit of a nonparametric polynomial regression model, separately estimated on both sides of the 
cutoff point (the policy change, in October 2009), and we are unable to find an impact of the reform. 
  
7 Conclusions 
Using an RDD framework, this study evaluates the effects of a policy that in 2009 eliminated the co-
payment for noninvasive prenatal screening tests in a large Italian region. We make four key findings. 
First, eliminating the co-payment triggered an economically and statistically significant increase in 
the take-up rates of prenatal tests by 7-10 percentage points, and such increase is persistent over time.   
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Second, we do not find any substitution effect with the more expensive and invasive diagnostic tests. 
The absence of substitution effects is mostly explained by the group of women older than 35 years at 
conception, who are at higher risk of congenital disorders, and who are thus more likely to undergo 
an invasive diagnostic test. At the time of the new policy, this group was already exempted from the 
co-payment for the invasive test and is therefore likely to have been less sensitive to price changes.  
Third, we find that the effect of the policy is larger for younger women, foreigners, those residing in 
metropolitan areas, and those with low and medium levels of education. Hence, the policy change 
produced the expected effects of increasing the take-up for more disadvantaged groups that had lower 
screening test rates before the co-payment was eliminated. Finally, we do not find any effect on 
newborn health outcomes, but we find that screening tests positively affect mothers’ health behaviors 
as measured by less weight gain, less alcohol consumption, and fewer hospital admissions during 
pregnancy. 
In terms of policy implications, our analysis suggests that eliminating co-payments can be an effective 
policy lever to encourage the take-up of screening tests. This helps to address both efficiency 
concerns, due to relevant market failures, such as the underestimation of benefits associated with the 
use of prenatal care, and equity concerns, as the increase in prenatal care access is higher among 
more-disadvantaged groups. It is also worth highlighting that the cost of eliminating the co-payment 
was relatively inexpensive.25    
In terms of allocative efficiency, eliminating the co-payment for noninvasive screening tests does not 
lead to any substitution effect between noninvasive and invasive tests. If the rate of invasive tests is 
deemed to be too high by policymakers due to excessive costs and the high number of miscarriages, 
other policy instruments will have to be considered. For instance, a woman’s access to an invasive 
diagnostic test might become conditional on the presence of a high risk of genetic disorders, assessed 
on the basis of positive results of a previous screening test rather than on the mother’s age alone.  
Finally, our analysis suggests that increasing the take-up of noninvasive screening tests has a positive 
impact on maternal health. Improved nutrition and better access to other prenatal care services are 
possible channels for explaining these health benefits. Therefore, screening tests appear to generate 
positive spillover toward other policy efforts aimed at improving maternal health. We lack additional 
data (e.g. on nutrition or other prenatal care services utilization) to rule out (or validate) these 
explanations. Future research could explore those efforts.  
                                                          
25 The resolution of the Regional Government (Delibere della Giunta Regionale) n. 38-11960, August 4, 2009 established 
that the annual additional costs for the public administration following the co-payment elimination was €500,000. The 
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Table 1. Number and Proportion of Women Undergoing Different Prenatal Tests 
 
  Whole Sample Pre-Policy Post-Policy 
No Test 7,664 4,791 2,873 
 23.35 28.09 18.21 
Screening Test Only 21,848 10,609 11,239 
 66.55 62.21 71.24 
Diagnostic Test Only 2,297 1,139 1,158 
 7.00 6.68 7.34 
Both Tests 1,020 514 506 
 3.10 3.02 3.21 
Total 32,829 17,053 15,776 
 100 100 100 
 







Table 2. Summary Statistics of Health Outcomes. 
 
Panel A. Mothers’ health outcomes. 
  
             Whole Sample       Pre-Policy       Post-Policy 
   Mean  SD  N  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Weight Gain in Pregnancy 13.125 4.673 27,874 13.218 4.870 13.033 4.467 
Weight Gain in Preg. >15 kg 0.240       0.427 27,874 0.245  0.430 0.235       0.424 
Smoke in Pregnancy 0.073 0.260 32,829 0.071 0.257 0.075 0.264 
Alcohol in Pregnancy 0.041 0.199 32,829 0.054 0.225 0.028 0.164 
Folic Acid in Pregnancy 0.826 0.379 32,829 0.794 0.404 0.860 0.347 
Hospital Admissions in Preg. 0.037   0.189     22,935 0.035 0.185 0.039 0.193 
 
 
Panel B. Newborn health outcomes. 
 
            Whole Sample      Pre-Policy       Post-Policy 
   Mean  SD  N  Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Low Weight 0.055 0.229 33,048 0.054 0.225 0.057 0.232 
Newborn Length  49.51       2.010 32,333 49.55   1.996 49.47   2.024 
Head Circumference 34.00        1.31 32,427 34.01   1.299 33.98   1.321 
Low Apgar-1 min 0.202 0.401 32,118 0.204 0.403 0.200 0.400 
Low Apgar-5 min  0.055 0.227 32,135 0.056 0.230 0.053 0.224 
Resuscitation  0.034 0.182 33,049 0.034 0.181 0.034 0.182 
Preterm 0.054 0.227 33,049 0.054 0.227 0.054 0.226 
Stillbirth 0.003 0.051 33,049 0.003 0.051 0.003 0.050 
 
Notes: All variables are binary variables, except for “Newborn Length” and “Head Circumference” both expressed in 




Table 3. Percentage of Women Who Do Not Undergo Any Prenatal Tests, Within Different Subsamples 
 
 Whole Sample Pre-Policy Post-Policy 
Age groups:    
Age group 18–24 38.5 43.4 33.2 
Age group 25–29 24.0 28.6 19.2 
Age group 30–34 19.0 23.6 13.8 
Age group 35+ 17.5 22.8 12.1 
    
Education levels:    
Low Education 31.7 36.8 25.9 
Medium Education 21.0 25.4 16.1 
High education 17.9 22.2 13.9 
    
Nationality:    
Foreign Born 38.7 43.5 33.7 
Native 18.7 23.5 13.3 
    
Area of residence:    
Nonmetropolitan area 21.7 25.6 17.2 




Table 4. Effect of Policy Change on the Prenatal Tests’ Take-Up Rates 
 
Dep. Var.: No Test Screening Test Diagnostic Test Both Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Assignment Ai  -0.073 0.065 0.008 -0.0002 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.005) 
Linear Trend, (Ci-C*) -0.001 0.001 0.0001 0.00007 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
Assignment Ai x Linear Trend, (Ci-C*) 0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0001 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Age group 25–29 -0.067 0.073 -0.005 -0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age group 30–34 -0.089 0.079 0.003 0.007 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.002) 
Age group 35+  -0.093 -0.239 0.269 0.064 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.004) 
Medium Education -0.026 0.018 0.003 0.005 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.002) 
High education  -0.027 0.018 0.005 0.004 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.005) (0.002) 
Employed  -0.080 0.069 0.007 0.004 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.003) 
Married  0.036 -0.014 -0.019 -0.003 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.00) 
Native  -0.111 0.091 0.014 0.006 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.002) 
Father Employed -0.176 0.147 0.022 0.008 
  (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.004) 
Twin  0.017 -0.004 -0.001 -0.012 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) 
Past Miscarriage -0.017 0.014 -0.001 0.005 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) 
Past Abortion  -0.036 0.027 0.008 0.001 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) 
Metropolitan Area 0.030 -0.026 -0.005 0.0002 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.003) (0.002) 
Constant  0.614 0.396 -0.010 0.001 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.005) 
     
Adj. R2  0.09 0.10 0.20 0.02 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.233 0.666 0.070 0.031 
N. Obs.  32,829 32,829 32,829 32,829 
 
Notes: Each column presents the estimation of equation (1) by OLS, on the sample of women becoming pregnant during 
the 52 weeks before and the 52 weeks after the policy change. The dependent variables are: No Test (equal to one if the 
woman had no prenatal tests, and zero otherwise) in column 1; Screening Test (equal to one if a screening test is 
undertaken, and zero otherwise) in column 2; Diagnostic Test (equal to one if an invasive diagnostic test is undertaken, 
and zero otherwise) in column 3; and Both Tests (equal to one if the woman had a screening test followed by an invasive 
diagnostic test, and zero otherwise) in column 4. Assignment Ai, is equal to one in the post- policy period. All equations 
include the term (Ci – C*), that is, the number of weeks between the conception date Ci, and the cutoff date C*, and its 
interaction with the treatment assignment variable. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of district of 




Table 5. Effect of Policy Change on the Prenatal Tests’ Take-Up Rates: Age Groups 
 
Dep. Var.: No Test Screening Test Diagnostic Test Both Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Specification: Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic 
         
1. Subsample: Age 18–24 (N. Obs. 5,424)       
Assignment Ai  -0.074 -0.108 0.072 0.113 0.004 0.003 -0.002 -0.007 
  (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.08) (0.004) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Adj. R2  0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.003 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.385      0.599 0.005 0.011 
2. Subsample: Age 25–29 (N. Obs. 9,280)       
Assignment Ai  -0.075 -0.100 0.077 0.094 0.001 0.007 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.04) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.01) 
         
Adj. R2  0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.240 0.738 0.008 0.014 
3. Subsample: Age 30–34 (N. Obs. 11,196)       
Assignment Ai  -0.072 -0.101 0.072 0.105 -0.002 -0.006 0.002 0.001 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Adj. R2  0.07 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.003 0.003 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.190      0.767 0.019   0.024 
4. Subsample: Age 35+ (N. Obs. 6,929)       
Assignment Ai  -0.079 -0.086 0.055 0.041 0.023 0.039 -0.0002 0.006 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
         
Adj. R2  0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.01 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.175 0.457 0.286 0.082 
5. Subsample: Age 32–38 (N. Obs. 10,102)       
         
Assignment Ai   -0.078   -0.094   0.077   0.090   -0.001   -0.003   0.001   0.007  
   (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.01)   (0.01)  
Age Group 35+  -0.004   0.018   -0.156  -0.158  0.135  0.120   0.024   0.020  
   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.06)   (0.03)   (0.05)   (0.02)   (0.02)  
Assignment Ai x 
Age Group 35+ 
 0.007   0.001   -0.029   -0.019   0.018   0.021   0.005   -0.002 
   (0.03)   (0.04)   (0.05)   (0.07)   (0.04)   (0.06)   (0.02)   (0.03)  
         
Adj. R2   0.08   0.08   0.11   0.11   0.14   0.14   0.01   0.01  
Mean Dep. Var. 0.181 0.642 0.128 0.049 
 
Notes: Each row presents the estimation of equation (1) by OLS, for different subsamples of women. The table reports 
only the post-policy dummy variable Assignment Ai. All equations include the term (Ci – C*), its square (only in even 
columns 2, 4, 6, and 8), and the corresponding interactions with the treatment assignment variable. All equations also 
include the full set of observable characteristics for women. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of 







Table 6. Effect of Policy Change on the Prenatal Tests’ Take-Up Rates: Education Level, Nationality, and 
Residence 
 
Dep. Var.: No Test Screening Test Diagnostic Test Both Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Specification: Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic 
         
1. Subsample: Low Education (N. Obs. 9,277)      
Assignment Ai  -0.072 -0.099 0.054 0.061 0.014 0.028 0.005 0.009 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Adj. R2  0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.19 0.19 0.02 0.02 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.317   0.614   0.047   0.021 
2. Subsample: Medium Education (N. Obs. 16,467)      
Assignment Ai  -0.077 -0.116 0.072 0.104 0.003 0.010 0.001 0.002 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Adj. R2  0.07 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.02 0.02 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.210   0.684   0.073   0.033 
3. Subsample: High Education (N. Obs. 7,085)      
Assignment Ai  -0.064 -0.048 0.062 0.069 0.010 -0.006 -0.008 -0.015 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) 
Adj. R2  0.04 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.02 0.02 
Mean Dep. Var.  0.179 0.689   0.093   0.039 
4. Subsample: Native (N. Obs. 25,141)       
Assignment Ai -0.070 -0.087 0.058 0.068 0.010 0.016 0.002 0.003 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Adj. R2  0.05 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.02 0.02 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.187  0.692  0.085  0.036 
5. Subsample: Foreign Born (N. Obs.7,688)      
Assignment Ai -0.078 -0.129 0.086 0.145 -0.000 -0.005 -0.007 -0.011 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Adj. R2  0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.12 0.12 0.02 0.01 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.387   0.578  0.020   0.015 
6. Subsample: Metropolitan (N. Obs. 12,784)      
Assignment Ai -0.142 -0.186 0.121 0.161 0.022 0.023 -0.001 0.003 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Adj. R2  0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.19 0.02 0.02 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.259   0.638   0.071    0.032 
7. Subsample: Nonmetropolitan (N. Obs. 20,045)      
Assignment Ai -0.027 -0.037 0.027 0.034 -0.002 0.004 0.001 -0.002 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
Adj. R2  0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.20 0.20 0.02 0.02 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.217   0.683   0.070   0.030 
 
Notes: Each row presents the estimation of equation (1) by OLS, for different subsamples of women. The table reports 
only the post-policy dummy variable Assignment Ai. All equations include the trend (Ci – C*), its squared term (only in 
even columns 2, 4, 6, and 8), and the corresponding interactions with the treatment assignment variable. All equations 
also include the full set of observable characteristics for women. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level 




Table 7. Persistence in the Effect of Policy Change on the Prenatal Tests’ Take-Up Rates 
 
Dep. Var.: No Test Screening Test Diagnostic Test Both Tests 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Specification: Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic 
         
Policy Change on Oct. 1, 2010  
(N. Obs. 31,707) 
      
Assignment Ai  -0.065 -0.075 0.083 0.102 -0.009 -0.014 -0.010 -0.014 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Adj. R2  0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.03 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.222     0.682  0.061   0.034 
Policy Change on Oct. 1, 2011 
(N. Obs. 30,336) 
      
Assignment Ai  -0.114 -0.133 0.123 0.142 -0.013 -0.016 0.004 0.007 
  (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
         
Adj. R2  0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.03 0.03 
Mean Dep. Var. 0.225 0.681   0.063  0.030 
         
Notes: Each row presents the estimation of equation (1) by OLS, for different simulated samples. The table reports only 
the post-policy dummy variable Assignment Ai. All equations include the term (Ci – C*), its square (only in even columns 
2, 4, 6, and 8), and the corresponding interactions with the treatment assignment variable. All equations also include the 
full set of observable characteristics for women. When we simulate policy change on October 1, 2010, we substitute the 
post-policy data with the data for women who became pregnant between October 2010 and October 2011. When we 
simulate policy change on October 1, 2011, we substitute the post-policy data with the data for women who became 
pregnant between October 2011 and October 2012. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of district 
of residence– quarter of conception (144 clusters for the policy change on October 1, 2010, and 134 clusters for a policy 























 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Screening Test  -4.141 -0.233 -0.060 -0.469 -0.108 -0.495 
  (2.04) (0.15) (0.11) (0.21) (0.42) (0.17) 
[p-value] [0.04] [0.12] [0.58] [0.03] [0.79] [0.004] 
{Sharpened FDR q-value} {0.23} {0.28} {0.96} {0.21} {0.99} {0.06} 
Linear Trend, (Ci-C*)  0.002 0.0003 0.0003 0.001 0.002 0.002 
  (0.003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Assignment Ai x 
Linear Trend (Ci-C*) 
0.001 -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
  (0.01) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age group 25–29 0.302 0.013 -0.012 0.039 0.033 0.030 
  (0.21) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
Age group 30–34 -0.057 -0.018 -0.024 0.055 0.032 0.036 
  (0.26) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Age group 35+  -1.734 -0.126 -0.047 -0.063 -0.010 -0.100 
  (0.33) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) 
Medium Education -0.114 -0.018 -0.029 0.020 0.041 0.007 
  (0.08) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
High education  -0.639 -0.073 -0.059 0.017 0.055 0.003 
  (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Employed  0.677 0.030 -0.001 0.038 0.053 0.026 
  (0.16) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.01) 
Married  -0.560 -0.051 -0.054 -0.009 0.011 -0.001 
  (0.08) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Native  0.322 0.004 0.061 0.046 0.110 0.051 
  (0.24) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) 
Father Employed 0.708 0.028 0.009 0.079 0.190 0.067 
  (0.20) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) 
Twin  2.591 0.252 -0.011 -0.016 0.018 0.062 
  (0.31) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Past Miscarriage 0.193 0.017 0.019 0.019 0.074 0.022 
  (0.10) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Past Abortion  0.723 0.066 0.073 0.049 0.048 0.030 
  (0.11) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Metropolitan Area 0.039 0.009 0.007 0.044 0.037 0.000 
  (0.09) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) 
Constant  15.383 0.431 0.133 0.200 0.553 0.278 
  (1.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.19) (0.08) 
















OLS Results:       
Screening Test 0.009 -0.002 0.005 -0.027 0.155 -0.005 
  (0.07) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.11 0.01 
       
N. Obs.  27,874 27,874 32,829 32,829 32,829 22,935 
 
Notes: Each column presents the estimation of equation (2) by 2SLS. The Screening Test variable is a binary variable 
equal to one if a woman had a noninvasive screening test during pregnancy, and zero otherwise. Assignment Ai, equal to 
one in the post-policy period, is the instrumental variable for Screening Test. Standard errors (in round parentheses) are 
clustered at the level of district of residence–quarter of conception.  OLS results for equation (2) are reported (Screening 
Test coefficient and Adj. R2 only). Below the ‘Screening test’ coefficient, the table reports the original p-values (square 
brackets) and the “adjusted” p-values (in braces, the sharpened False Discovery Rate, FDR, q-values by Anderson, 2008), 



















Resuscit. Preterm Stillbirth 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
         
Screening Test 0.073 -3.247 -1.879 0.031 -0.021 -0.040 0.069 -0.008 
  (0.09) (2.00) (1.16) (0.35) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.02) 
[p-value] [0.39] [0.10] [0.10] [0.93] [0.85] [0.67] [0.43] [0.63] 
{Sharpened FDR q-value} {0.77} {0.28} {0.28} {0.99} {0.99} {0.96} {0.77} {0.96} 
Linear Trend, (Ci-C*) 0.000 0.002 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Assignment Ai x Lin. 
Trend (Ci-C*) 
-0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Age group 25–29 -0.002 0.227 0.169 0.002 0.006 0.007 -0.005 0.002 
  (0.01) (0.17) (0.10) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Age group 30–34 0.003 0.202 0.173 0.011 0.008 0.010 0.000 0.003 
  (0.01) (0.19) (0.11) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Age group 35+  0.036 -0.690 -0.312 0.030 0.013 0.007 0.029 0.001 
  (0.02) (0.35) (0.20) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) 
Medium Education -0.011 0.173 0.073 -0.025 -0.014 -0.005 -0.010 0.000 
  (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
High education  -0.015 0.271 0.189 -0.026 -0.009 -0.007 -0.013 -0.001 
  (0.00) (0.06) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Employed  -0.012 0.294 0.160 -0.007 -0.000 -0.002 -0.007 -0.000 
  (0.01) (0.15) (0.08) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Married  -0.004 0.007 0.040 -0.000 0.001 0.004 -0.003 -0.000 
  (0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Native  0.005 0.021 -0.011 -0.021 -0.006 -0.002 -0.015 0.000 
  (0.01) (0.20) (0.12) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
Father Employed -0.022 0.650 0.268 -0.026 -0.020 0.005 -0.026 -0.002 
  (0.01) (0.35) (0.20) (0.04) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) 
Twin  0.585 -3.674 -1.513 0.218 0.128 0.058 0.547 0.003 
  (0.02) (0.18) (0.10) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) 
Past Miscarriage 0.001 0.119 0.056 -0.003 0.001 0.006 0.002 -0.001 
  (0.00) (0.07) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Past Abortion  0.000 0.114 -0.037 -0.012 -0.010 0.006 0.003 0.000 
  (0.00) (0.08) (0.05) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
Metropolitan Area 0.003 -0.042 -0.092 -0.023 0.000 0.002 0.000 -0.000 
  (0.00) (0.08) (0.04) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant  0.025 50.847 34.855 0.234 0.095 0.055 0.044 0.009 
  (0.04) (0.86) (0.50) (0.17) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) 




















OLS results:         
Screening Test -0.005 0.019 -0.039 -0.018 -0.012 -0.004 -0.006 -0.001 
  (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) 
Adj. R2 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.10 0.001 
         
N. Obs.  33,048 32,333 32,427 32,118 32,135 33,049 33,049 33,049 
 
Notes: Each column presents the estimation of equation (2) by 2SLS. The Screening Test variable is a binary variable 
equal to one if a woman had a noninvasive screening test during pregnancy, and zero otherwise. Assignment Ai, equal to 
one in the post-policy period, is the instrumental variable for Screening Test. Standard errors (in round parentheses) are 
clustered at the level of district of residence–quarter of conception. OLS results for equation (2) are reported (Screening 
Test coefficient and Adj. R2 only). Below the ‘Screening test’ coefficient, the table reports the original p-values (square 
brackets) and the “adjusted” p-values (in braces, the sharpened False Discovery Rate, FDR, q-values by Anderson, 2008), 
to account for multiple testing hypothesis.  
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Notes: The y-axis measures the proportion of women undergoing no prenatal tests (top-left panel), a screening test (top-
right panel), a diagnostic test (bottom-left panel), and both tests (bottom-right panel). The x-axis measures the number of 
weeks to (from) the policy change date (the zero value). Each dot represents the proportion for that week (Bin Average). 
The solid lines are the fit of a nonparametric polynomial regression model, separately estimated on both sides of the cutoff 










Notes: The y-axis measures the number of voluntary terminations of pregnancy (VTP, left panel), and the abortion ratio 
equal to the number of VTP to total number of births (right panel). The x-axis measures the number of months to (from) 
the policy change date (the zero value, October 2009). Each dot represents the number of VTP or the VTP ratio for that 
month (Bin Value). The solid lines are the fit of a nonparametric polynomial regression model, separately estimated on 
both sides of the cutoff point (Polynomial Fit). The shaded grey area represents the 95 percent confidence interval (95 
percent CI). Data include all VTP that occurred during the second trimester of pregnancy, within the administrative 





Table A1. Definition of Mothers’ Characteristics 
 
Variable Definition 
 Age at Conception Age at conception, expressed in years 
 Age group 18–24 Binary variable equal to one if  age at conception is in the  18–24 range 
 Age group 25–29 Binary variable equal to one if the age at conception is in the  25–29 range 
 Age group 30–34 Binary variable equal to one if the age at conception is in the  30–34 range 
 Age group 35+ Binary variable equal to one if the age at conception is equal to or above 35 
 Low Education Binary variable equal to one if the woman completed compulsory school or has no education 
 Medium Education Binary variable equal to one if the woman completed high school 
 High education Binary variable equal to if the woman has a university  or  higher degree  
 Employed Binary variable equal to one if the woman is employed 
 Married Binary variable equal to one if the woman is married 
 Native Binary variable equal to one if the woman is born in Italy 
 Father Employed Binary variable equal to one if the father is employed 
 Twin Binary variable equal to one for a twin pregnancy 
 Past Miscarriage Binary variable equal to one if the woman had past miscarriages 
 Past Abortion Binary variable equal to one if the woman had past abortions 
 Metropolitan Area Binary variable equal to one if the woman lives in a metropolitan area; Metropolitan areas 
are defined by the metropolitan area of Torino—the regional capital—and of the other seven 
largest towns of the region (provincial capitals). 
 
 
Table A2. Summary Statistics of Mothers’ Characteristics 
 
 Whole Sample            Pre-Policy               Post-Policy 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
 Age at Conception 30.007 5.376 29.998 5.343 30.015 5.412 
 Age group 18–24 0.165 0.371 0.165 0.371 0.165 0.371 
 Age group 25–29 0.283 0.450 0.278 0.448 0.287 0.452 
 Age group 30–34 0.341 0.474 0.350 0.477 0.331 0.471 
 Age group 35+ 0.211 0.408 0.206 0.404 0.216 0.412 
 Low Education 0.283 0.450 0.294 0.456 0.270 0.444 
 Medium Education 0.502 0.500 0.506 0.500 0.497 0.500 
 High education 0.216 0.411 0.200 0.400 0.233 0.423 
 Employed 0.711 0.453 0.707 0.455 0.716 0.451 
 Married 0.593 0.491 0.588 0.492 0.599 0.490 
 Native 0.766 0.423 0.771 0.420 0.760 0.427 
 Father Employed 0.910 0.286 0.898 0.302 0.923 0.267 
 Twin 0.010 0.101 0.009 0.094 0.012 0.108 
 Past Miscarriage 0.120 0.325 0.117 0.321 0.125 0.330 
 Past Abortion 0.075 0.264 0.071 0.256 0.080 0.271 
 Metropolitan Area 0.389 0.488 0.374 0.484 0.406 0.491 
 






Table A3. Test of the Smoothness of Mothers’ Characteristics Around the Cutoff Date of the Policy 
 
 Assignment Ai Std. Err. 
Dep. Var.   
 Age at Conception 0.006 (0.02) 
 Age group 18–24 0.015 (0.02) 
 Age group 25–29 -0.015 (0.02) 
 Age group 30–34 -0.007 (0.02) 
 Age group 35+ -0.115 (0.28) 
 Low Education 0.007 (0.03) 
 Medium Education -0.027 (0.03) 
 High education 0.020 (0.02) 
 Employed -0.018 (0.03) 
 Married 0.004 (0.03) 
 Native -0.005 (0.05) 
 Father Employed -0.001 (0.03) 
 Twin 0.002 (0.003) 
 Past Miscarriage -0.027 (0.01) 
 Past Abortion -0.005 (0.01) 
 Metropolitan Area 0.009 (0.21) 
 
Notes: In each row we estimate the following equation by OLS: 
   + = 9 + :" + ∑ 9$(% − %
∗)$4$() + ∑ ;$" × (% − %
∗)$4$() + <                                 
where each single observed mother characteristic + is considered  a placebo outcome and  is regressed on: 1) the treatment 
assignment dummy variable "  equal to one in the post-policy period; 2) the term (Ci – C*), i.e. the number of weeks 
between the conception date Ci and the cutoff date C*, 3) the term (Ci – C*) squared, 4) the interaction of the trend (Ci – 
C*) with the treatment assignment variable. The table reports only the coefficient  :, for the post-policy dummy variable. 
Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of district of residence–quarter of conception (138 clusters). 





Table A4. Effect of Policy Change on Prenatal Tests’ Take-Up Rates: Nonlinear Specifications 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Quadratic Cubic Quartic 
    
Dep. Var.: No Test    
    
Assignment Ai -0.097 -0.107 -0.087 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
Adj. R2 0.09 0.09 0.09 
    
Dep. Var.: Screening Test    
    
Assignment Ai 0.085 0.089 0.064 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) 
Adj. R2 0.10 0.10 0.10 
    
Dep. Var.: Diagnostic Test    
    
Assignment Ai 0.012 0.012 0.010 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Adj. R2 0.20 0.20 0.20 
    
Dep. Var.: Both Tests    
    
Assignment Ai 0.0002 0.006 0.013 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 
 
Notes: Each row presents the estimation of equation (1) by OLS. The table reports only the post-policy dummy variable 
Assignment Ai. All equations include the trend (Ci – C*), its squared term, its cubic term (only in columns 2 and 3), its 
quartic term (in column 4 only), and all the corresponding interactions with the treatment assignment variable. All 
equations also include the full set of observable characteristics for women (age, highest education level, mother’s 
employment status, father’s employment status, marital status, twin pregnancy, previous miscarriages and abortions, area 
of residence, and nationality). Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the level of district of residence–quarter of 





Table A5. Effect of Policy Change on Prenatal Tests’ Take-Up Rates: Alternative Bandwidths 
 
 Bandwidth 26 weeks Bandwidth 104 weeks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Linear Quadratic Linear Quadratic 
     
Dep. Var.: No Test     
     
Assignment Ai  -0.096 -0.086 -0.077 -0.069 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Adj. R2 0.08 0.08 0.10 0.10 
     
Dep. Var.: Screening Test     
Assignment Ai  0.084 0.067 0.071 0.056 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) 
Adj. R2 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.11 
     
Dep. Var.: Diagnostic Test     
Assignment Ai  0.012 0.008 0.006 0.012 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Adj. R2 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 
     
Dep. Var.: Both Test     
Assignment Ai  0.001 0.011 -0.0004 0.0004 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.004) (0.01) 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
     
N. Obs.  17,228 17,228 64,703 64,703 
 
Notes: Each row presents the estimation of equation (1) by OLS. The table reports only the post-policy dummy variable 
Assignment Ai. All equations include the trend (Ci – C*), its squared term (only in columns 2 and 4), and all the 
corresponding interactions with the treatment assignment variable. All equations also include the full set of observable 
characteristics for women (age, highest education level, mother’s employment status, father’s employment status, marital 
status, twin pregnancy, previous miscarriages and abortions, area of residence, and nationality). Standard errors (in 




Table A6. Effect of Policy Change on the Prenatal Tests’ Take-Up Rates: Nonparametric Specifications 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Linear Quadratic Cubic Quartic 
     
Dep. Var.: No Test     
     
Assignment Ai  -0.092 -0.100 -0.099 -0.098 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 
bandwidth  39 44 53 54 
     
Dep. Var.: Screening Test     
     
Assignment Ai  0.080 0.083 0.075 0.078 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
bandwidth  40 44 48 54 
     
Dep. Var.: Diagnostic Test     
     
Assignment Ai 0.010 0.011 0.012 0.012 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
bandwidth  50 56 57 69 
     
Dep. Var.: Both Tests     
     
Assignment Ai 0.0002 0.002 0.010 0.010 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
bandwidth  46 54 47 72 
 
Notes: Each row presents the estimation of equation (1). Estimation method is local linear and polynomial (up to the 
fourth order) nonparametric in all columns. The optimal bandwidth is chosen by the MSE-optimal bandwidth selector, 
and the observations are weighted by a triangular kernel. The table reports only the post-policy dummy variable 
Assignment Ai. All equations also include the full set of observable characteristics for women. Standard errors (in 






Figure A1. Distribution of Pregnant Women 
 
 
Panel A. Histogram of pregnant women density according to the conception week, around the policy change. 
 
 


















Figure A2. Mothers’ Characteristics Around the Policy Change (continued) 
 
 
Notes: The y-axis measures the mothers’ characteristics. The x-axis measures the number of weeks to (from) the policy 
change date (the zero value). Each dot represents the average mother’s characteristics for that week (Bin Average). The 
solid lines are the fit of a nonparametric polynomial regression model, separately estimated on both sides of the cutoff 










Notes: Each plot shows seven replications of equation (1). The dependent variables are no prenatal tests (top-left panel), 
screening test (top-right panel), diagnostic test (bottom-left panel), and both tests (bottom-right panel). In each replication, 
we consider a different cutoff date for the policy change, from January 1, 2009 to October 1, 2009, at four-week intervals. 
We exclude women who became pregnant in July, August, or September 2009. The plots show the point estimates and 
the 95 percent confidence intervals. The x-axis measures the estimated coefficients for the treatment assignment Ai, a 
dummy variable equal to one in the post-policy period, in equation (1), for the linear specification only. The y-axis reports 





Figure A4. The Effect of Screening Tests on Mother’s Health behaviors by Subsample 
 
Notes: Each plot shows 2SLS results of equation (2) for seven subsamples of women (low educated, medium educated, 
high educated, native, foreign born, living in metropolitan areas, and living in nonmetropolitan areas). The dependent 
variables are weight gain during pregnancy and weight gain during pregnancy larger than 15 kg (top panels), smoking 
during pregnancy and consuming alcohol during pregnancy (middle panels), and folic acid supplements during pregnancy 
and hospital admission in pregnancy (bottom panels). The plots show the point estimates and the 95 percent confidence 
intervals. The x-axis measures the estimated coefficients for the screening test, a dummy variable equal to one if the 
woman had a screening test, and zero otherwise. The instrumental variable for the screening test variable is the post-




Figure A5. The Effect of Screening Tests on Newborn Health Outcomes by Subsample 
 
 
Notes: Each plot shows 2SLS results of equation (2) for seven subsamples of women (low educated, medium educated, high educated, 
native, foreign born, living in metropolitan areas, and living in nonmetropolitan areas). The dependent variables are health outcomes 
for newborns. The plots show the point estimates and the 95 percent confidence intervals. The x-axis measures the estimated 
coefficients for the screening test, a dummy variable equal to one if the woman had a screening test, and zero otherwise. The 
instrumental variable for the screening test variable is the post-policy dummy variable Assignment Ai. The y-axis reports the 
considered subsamples. 
